Ilisu Debate: NGO and Balfour Beatty go head-to-head in a debate over the Ilisu Dam.

A Response to Ilisu Critics By Nigel Sloan, Balfour Beatty

Published in International Water Power & Dam Construction, April 2000

The proposed dam and hydroelectric scheme at Ilisu has been the subject of criticisms from NGOs and newspapers. Friends of the Earth, the UK Guardian and the Berne Declaration have been at the forefront. These criticisms are based largely on misunderstanding, misconception, out-of-date information, exaggeration or just errors.

Balfour Beatty is not the promoter of Ilisu dam, which is a Turkish government project, but is applying for UK export credits to cover the part of construction costs represented by exports from the UK (US$200 million or 10% of total project costs). The company has played an active role in the preparation and discussion of the environmental impact assessment of the project. It has confirmed that the international contracting group will not proceed to the construction stage until an agreement is reached between Turkey and the seven funding governments on the environmental issues in that assessment.

It is an unavoidable consequence of all large hydro schemes that the inhabitants of the reservoir area must move. The key to acceptability is how compensation and resettlement is handled. It is gareed that the benefits of any project to the wider population should not be at the expense of costs borne by the local population. At Ilisu, Turkish authorities have committed themselves to a process of professional socio-economic surveys and local public consultation to offer everyone affected the choice of local resettlement, or cash compensation and relocation support services. As dam impounding is still some eight years away there is plenty of time.

The ethnic composition of the planned reservoir area is mixed, but all have the same legal rights to compensation with rights of appeal all the way to Strasbourg if necessary. At Ilisu, there will be an international panel of experts to assist and assess the progress of resettlement. Turkey would like Ilisu to be a showcase for its proper handling of resettlement, and it believes the project will bring new prospects to an impoverished area.

Much of Hasankeyf, built by Seljuk Turks in the early 12th century would, regrettably, be flooded by the project, but fortunately not the Upper Town which would survive on a dramatic cliff-top site. Current inhabitants of Hasankeyf are of varied ethnic origin and only re-occupied the site in the 1960s, after it was abandoned at the end of the First World War. The Turkish Ministry of Culture, together with Turkish and foreign universities, has already commenced a programme of archaeological research to identify which buildings in the lower town would merit rescue. It may be that Ilisu will prove the catalyst for the preservation of the best of Hasankeyf, in contrast to its current state of decay and collapse. However, Anatolia has many towns dating from that period, as indeed it has from many centuries earlier.

There are concerns that Ilisu will cause an outbreak of Malaria, but there is no reason to expect any increase in the number of mosquitoes. Malaria already exists in the area, and a deep reservoir would be a less attractive breeding ground than the existing terrain. There is no Leishmaniosis in the area. It tends to occur in areas of irrigated cultivated land. Such habitats will not be created, so there is no reason to expect Leishmaniosis.

Ilisu is purely a hydroelectric power scheme, with no irrigation component. All the water that flows through the turbines must carry on downstream. The only net loss of water would be eavporation from the reservoir surface area, calculated at less than 3% of normal river flow at that point. As no irrigation is involved Ilisu will not cause pollution from returned water. To avoid the danger of eutrophication new sewage treatment plants for towns upstream will be built.

Ilisu will not violate the 1997 UN Convention on Non-Navigational Use of International Waterways, which has not entered into force because it lacks the minimum number of countries to sign and ratify it. Turkey has not signed it, but then nor has Iraq, the UK or Switzerland.

Using Ilisu for political blackmail would be ineffective. Hydroelectric schemes operate with a full reservoir and at Ilisu, the minimum water level (at the end of the dry season) will be only 15m below the maximum level (early in the wet season). As no diversion canal exists, stopping flow through the turbines will lead to spillway overtopping in weeks.

The Tigris is of low strategic value to Syria as it only touches the Turkish-Syrian border for about 30km before entering Iraq. Within Iraq, the Tigris is joined by tributaries delivering in total more water than the main stream of the Tigris. The effect of any temporary stoppage at Ilisu would be substantially diluted, and is unlikely to be significant below the Mosul dam in northern Iraq. In fact, once in commercial operation, Ilisu will provide Syria and Iraq with at least double the current amount of water in a typical summer season by regulating the seasonal variations in river flows.

The growth in demand in Turkey is such that new capacity twice the size of Ilisu is needed annually for ten years. Whatever the scope for improving transmission the need for Ilisu remains. Complete elimination of transmission losses would only gain Turkey six months.

The process of environmental impact assessment is ongoing. The 1998 report identified key issues and work now focuses on research in those areas and discussions between the Export Credit Agencies, the consultants and the Turkish authorities on appropriate mitigation measures. The definitive Environmental Impact Assessment Report, complete with mitigation measures agreed by the Turkish authorities, will be made available for comment in Spring 2000.

Ilisu will enable a saving in greenhouse gas emissions of world significance. [NOTE: As of 1st June 2000, the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Ilisu dam has still not been made publicly available - Ilisu Dam Campaign.]

An NGO perspective on the Ilisu dam: VESTED INTERESTS AND POLITICS By Peter Bosshard, Berne Declaration (*)

Published in International Water Power & Dam Construction, April 2000.

Turkey's power consumption is less than one sixth of the OECD average per capita, and is growing rapidly. Does this trend warrant the construction of dams like Ilisu regardless of their cost? NGOs do not believe so. At a closer look, Ilisu illustrates the serious social, environmental, political and financial problems which beset many large dams. NGOs are particularly concerned about the following features:

NGO concerns

Social impacts: In South-East Anatolia, human rights are routinely violated, and thousands of villages have been destroyed by the military. It is naive to expect successful resettlement schemes in this context. Not surprisingly, earlier dam projects in the region have an abysmal record of rehabilitation. According to official surveys, 67-89 % of the people affected by these dams would like to go back to their original villages.

The project authorities estimate that Ilisu will displace 12-15,000 people. They discount thousands of people who have been evicted from their villages by the military, but intend to return home after the civil war. They disregard thousands of others who will not be displaced but will lose land. A report commissioned by the British government estimates that in total, the Ilisu reservoir will negatively affect more than 36,000 people. The creditor governments have pledged to comply with World Bank standards when financing Ilisu. Yet so far, these standards have been violated time and again during project preparation. As the confusing figures indicate, the affected people have never been properly identified. Even the local authorities have only been officially informed about the project in December 1999. No consultations regarding resettlement options or environmental impacts have ever taken place.
Environmental impacts: As the Ilisu consortium admits, the new reservoir will bring waterborne diseases like malaria to the region. The dam will also cut off the downstream areas from the seasonal floods on which their ecosystems and agriculture depend. Wastewater treatment facilities may prevent the reservoir from turning into a toxic pond. They will however not prevent a shortage of oxygen, a drop of the groundwater level, the interruption of the sediment flow and the erosion of the riverbed in the downstream area.
Regional tensions: Turkey is well-known for its aggressive water policies. "Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey's rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil", President Demirel stated bluntly at the opening of the Ataturk dam in 1992. And further: "This is a matter of sovereignty. We have the right to do anything we like." Consequently, Turkey was one of only three countries which opposed the Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses at the UN General Assembly in 1997. In violation of international law and of the pending Convention, Ankara has indeed made use of its purported "right" and has reduced the regional waterflows in periods of crisis since 1991.

Project proponents point out that more than half of Iraq's Tigris water is from tributaries which are not affected by Ilisu. Yet Turkey is now damming some of these other tributaries as well. While Ilisu is not an irrigation project, it does increase Ankara's clout to interrupt the river flow, and thus to blackmail the other riparian countries. Furthermore, the deterioration of the water quality has negative impacts on the downstream countries even under normal operating conditions. In spite of these impacts, Turkey refuses to inform or consult its neighbors about the construction of the Ilisu dam, and thus violates bilateral treaties and international customary law. As the protests from Syria and the Arab League demonstrate, the project is fueling regional tensions already now.
Economic viability: The Ilisu contract has never been up for public tender. An attempt by the Turkish government to implement the project on a BOT basis failed. In November 1998, the Swiss government guaranteed contracts for the so-called Ankara gas power project. At a cost of $380,000/Megawatt, this project costs less than a third of the Ilisu dam, which the Swiss government considered on the very same day. Rehabilitating Turkey's notoriously inefficient transmission system would be even more cost-efficient. These figures demonstrate that Ilisu does not make economic sense, and that more sustainable - and emission-free - alternatives are available. Ilisu is not a rational answer to Turkey's energy needs. It rather seems to be motivated by the strategic interests of the government in South-East Anatolia, and by the vested interests of the dam-building industry.

International standards - for real or for alibi?

As it stands now, Ilisu violates international law and contradicts five World Bank policies on 18 accounts. The World Bank has refrained from financing dam projects in South-East Anatolia since the mid-1980s. In 1999, it even turned down a request from the Swiss government to assist in the preparation of a rehabilitation action plan for Ilisu. The Turkish government in turn refused permission to the World Commission on Dams to independently evaluate the dams on the Tigris and Euphrates. In March 2000, the Trade and Industry Select Committee of the British Parliament also noted the "excessive degree of secrecy" and the "deplorable and counter-productive lack of transparency" in preparing the funding of the Ilisu project. What is the reason for this secrecy if Ilisu is a rational investment option?

Since private or multilateral finance could not be tapped, the Ilisu consortium has applied for funding from official export credit agencies. These agencies are the last group of public financial institutions which hardly apply any binding social and environmental standards. In the case of Ilisu, they have for the first time agreed to provide funding only if project implementation complies with international standards. Presumably they refer to the relevant World Bank policies. These policies are more than empty words. They require that alternative investment options be considered, riparian countries be consulted, and affected people be involved in a participatory process BEFORE a project is adopted. Similarly, the stakeholder report commissioned by the British government stipulates that "consultation/participation with local stakeholders should be in place before (...) the contract is signed".

If the creditor governments are serious about their commitment to international standards, the Turkish authorities must go back to the drawing board. This would allow the region's population, whose benefit the project supposedly serves, to identify and bring in their own development priorities. Equally, the creditor governments must be prepared to suspend their credits and guarantees if international standards are seriously violated during project implementation. So far, only the British government has agreed to accept this basic principle of project supervision and accountability.

If the Turkish authorities and the creditor governments are not prepared to draw lessons from their earlier experiences with dams in South-East Anatolia, international NGOs will continue to oppose the Ilisu project. Working together with representatives of the local people they will call the responsible governments, companies and banks to account for the human rights violations, the environmental destruction and the breach of international law which these parties could foresee but have not prevented.

(*) The Berne Declaration (www.evb.ch) is a Swiss public-interest group which promotes more equitable and sustainable North-South relations.